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ABSTRACT 
 
While the relationship between freedom of the media and corruption has been established, it is 
open whether media freedom also contributes to higher quality of government. The basic argument 
in this article is that previous research has been performed on media freedom and the access to 
public authority or at best, very specific parts of the way in which that authority is exercised, the 
relationship between freedom of the media and corruption. This leads to an extensive knowledge of 
free media’s role on the “input” side but less knowledge in terms of free media’s role on the “out-
put” side of government performance. This study examines the relationship between media free-
dom and quality of government in the 27 member states of the European Union. Two different 
concepts and measurements of quality of government are utilized (one geared toward less red tape 
and business friendly environments and one geared toward public services and welfare systems). 
The results show that free media contributes to high levels of quality of government when defined 
as “good for business” but not when defined as “good for public services and welfare systems”. In 
order to create and improve quality of government provided to citizens through public services and 
welfare systems, this only occurs when media freedom and women’s abilities for political empow-
erment are increased simultaneously. 
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Introduction 
The safeguarding of basic human rights and liberties is a precondition for democracy. Freedom of 
expression, which is the basis for freedom of the media, is part of the liberties guaranteed in the 
constitutions of democratic countries. Therefore, freedom of the media is often included in the 
measures developed to assess and compare the quality of democracy across countries. Democratic 
structures, however, do not necessarily lead to better government performance and higher quality 
of government in the sense of how public power is exercised (see e.g., Harriss-White and White 
1996; Sung 2004; Monitola and Jackman 2002; Keefer 2007; Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Charron and 
Lapuente 2010). The relationship between freedom of the media and democracy has been estab-
lished (see e.g., Norris 2000; Graber 2010), whereas it is open whether the latter also contributes to 
higher quality of government (see e.g., Rothstein and Teorell 2008). Instead, the research has been 
performed on the “input” side or at best, a very specific parts of the “output” side, the relationship 
between freedom of the media and incidence of corruption, as one among other indicators of gov-
ernment performance and the exercise of public authority (see e.g., Ahrend 2002; Brunetti and 
Weder 2003; Chowdhury 2004; Lederman et al. 2005; Freille et al. 2007). This leads to an extensive 
combined knowledge of free media’s role on the “input” side (democracy, politics, the elected side 
of government, and the access to public authority) but less knowledge in terms of free media’s im-
portance and impact on the “output” side (the non-elected side of government, public administra-
tion, and the way in which that authority is exercised), and which form the foundation of infor-
mation for electoral accountability. Free and fair democratic elections on the input-side is a precon-
dition for electoral accountability, but it is on the output-side and the exercise of public authority, 
where the citizens form their opinions of how well those in power actually fulfills their mandate. It 
is also on the output-side citizen’s personal experiences of public services are intertwined with in-
formation from the free media. Previous studies show a strong and robust negative relationship 
between free media and corruption but miss other important aspects of government performance 
and the exercise of public authority.    
 
The aim of this study is therefore to focus on the relationship between media freedom and quality 
of government, in that the concept of quality of government, unlike the concepts of democracy and 
corruption, captures both the input side (access to public authority) and the output side (exercise of 
public authority). It investigates the role of free media in establishing and maintaining quality of 
government institutions.  
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This article proceeds as follows. First, previous research on media freedom is presented. Second, 
the concept of quality of government is outlined. In the third section, the data is introduced. The 
focal relationship and results from the regression analyses are presented in the fourth section and 
the fifth section concludes. 
 
Research Overview 
Theoretically, the role of free media in processes of democratization is straightforward. The free 
media serve as watchdogs, monitoring those in power and provide citizens with the information 
they need to be free and self-governing and to hold governments accountable for their actions (Ad-
serà et al. 2003; Besley and Burgess 2001; Chowdhury 2004; Fell 2005; Gunaratne 2002; Norris 
2006). On the other hand, the role of free media can be considered two folded with importance for 
both the input and the output side. Free media are not just information channels informing voters 
about actions taken by politicians and agenda setters influencing the salience or accessibility of cer-
tain issues. Free media influencing and forms both the input for the policy-making process which 
can be described as “a structure of opportunities, risks, and potential costs and benefits”, constrain-
ing those in power (Russett et al. 2006:21), and the output side of the political system where free 
media influence policy outcomes, improving surveillance over office-holders, constraining their 
exercise of public authority, improve governmental effectiveness, and increase quality of govern-
ment. However, over the years, previous studies have mainly focused on the input side or a very 
limited part of the output side and the exercise of public authority. In the strict sense, they have 
only confirmed the relationship between free media and incidence of corruption as one of many 
indicators of government performance or democracy on the input side, while the exercise of public 
authority includes more than corruption. There is also indications, empirically, of a curvilinear rela-
tionship and an interaction between the level of democracy and the level of media freedom in that 
free media is very important in the fight against corruption in well-established democracies but less 
important in countries with lower levels of democracy (Montinola and Jackman 2002; Sung 2004; 
Färdigh et al. 2012). 
The main reason for scholars to studying and try to explain differences in corruption across coun-
tries in the first place was that it is detrimental to economic performance and therefore a central 
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issue in development policy and for economics with an almost non-existent interest in the im-
portance of free media (see e.g., Klitgaard 1988; De Soto 1989; Mauro 1995; Knack and Keefer 
1995; Brunetti et al. 1998; Johnson et al. 1998). Although, the attention given to the notion of free 
media has increased during the last decade but still concentrates primarily on corruption as the only 
aspect of how public authority is exercised. Some studies focus on countries media system charac-
teristics, suggesting that media competition, distribution and ownership has consequences for poli-
cy outcomes, corruption and quality of government. Djankov et al. (1999) suggests that countries 
with a large part of state-owned media tend to have higher levels of corruption where “government 
ownership of the press restricts information flows to the public, which reduces the quality of gov-
ernment” (Djankov et al. 2003:25). Suphachalasai (2005) shows that the degree of competition in 
media market plays a significant role in controlling corruption in that it enhances news production 
and effectiveness in monitoring corruption, and discourages bureaucrats from engaging in malfea-
sant behavior because of the risk of getting caught. Using two different indexes of press freedom 
and four different measures of corruption Brunetti and Weder (2003) found significant negative 
effects of media freedom on three of the four corruption indexes leading the authors to conclude 
that in countries with free media, corruption levels are likely to be low. Their data also allows for 
the determination of the causal relation and indicate that it is free media that serves as an important 
external check on corruption (Brunetti and Weder 2003:1821). 
Similarly, Chowdhury (2004) consider free media as an informative device with restraining effects 
on corruption. He suggests that free media brings cases of corruption to the attention of the voters 
who may punish corrupt politicians by ousting them from their offices. Therefore, the free media 
and democracy (represented by political competition and voters' participation) should both help to 
restrain corruption. In contrast to Suphachalasai (2005), the empirical findings suggest that voter 
participation is a more robust component than competition. Since the results holds across different 
settings Chowdhury concludes that free media and voters’ participation have a powerful and signif-
icant effect on corruption. 
In a study referring to earlier findings on the importance of (economic) openness on the level of 
corruption Charron (2009) explored the interplay of political and social openness and media free-
dom. He argues that the relationship between of openness and corruption may actually be caused 
by normative effects following from increased political interdependence of states that goes along 
with the spread of good governance and anti-corruption norms. At the same time leaders are more 
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and more exposed to international scrutiny that could prevent corrupt behavior. Charron, however, 
suggests that domestic press freedom is a precondition for the diffusion of those norms. His study 
that is based on data from more than 100 countries confirms that the international variables (open-
ness to trade, international organizations, social flows of information) "have little to no effect on 
corruption when press freedoms are low" (2009:1473-4). 
Similarly, Lessman and Markwardt (2010) pointed to the conditioning role of media freedom on the 
relation of decentralization and corruption. Using different corruption and decentralization 
measures, they found the impact of decentralization on the level of corruption to be dependent on 
a working informational infrastructure. Only in countries where media freedom provides for effec-
tive public monitoring decentralization lowers corruption. If the monitoring does not work and 
thus does not support the accountability effect of a decentralized structure, decentralization even 
has a negative impact on corruption and may contribute to its increase. 
While the studies outlined above have used an aggregate measure of media freedom, Freille et al. 
(2007) additionally drew on the differentiated concept underlying the Freedom of the Press Index 
by Freedom House and analyzed the effect of different forms of restrictions on media freedom 
(political environment, economical environment, and legal environment). Their study confirms that 
analyses of media freedom subcomponents are fruitful enterprises in pinning down what causal 
mechanisms are driving the relationship, and the findings confirm the close relationship between 
the aggregate measure of media freedom and corruption. The Freedom of the Press Index sub-
components, however, yield different effects with the political environment being somewhat more 
influential than the economical environment leading Freille et al. to conclude that, "reducing politi-
cal influence on the media may be an important step towards reducing corruption levels" 
(2007:854). Equally, as the authors argue, "improving the economic conditions for the press sector 
and contributing to a competitive environment would help to curb corruption" (2007:854). In con-
trast, the legal environment did not show the same strong and direct effect on corruption as the 
other two subcomponents of the Freedom house index possibly because its contribution may be 
absorbed by the economic development. 
Finally, in a study comparing 111 countries Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) developed an elaborate 
model of the relation between transparency and corruption. Their study is also an illustration of 
how systematic elaborations of the focal relationship can qualify for our understandings of causal 
mechanisms. They distinguish two types of transparency (controlled/not controlled by the "agent") 
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and further differentiate between transparency and publicity with the latter meaning that infor-
mation is not only accessible but indeed reaches the public. Just making information available will 
not prevent corruption (due to lack of demand, lack of mediators, and citizens’ lack of capabilities 
to process the information) unless there are favorable conditions already in place for publicity and 
accountability, i.e. media circulation, free and fair elections, and an educated electorate. Therefore, 
in order to take effect and prevent corruption it is necessary that this "publicity condition" is ac-
companied by an "accountability condition" in the sense that the public must have a sanctioning 
mechanism (elections in particular). The findings support the authors' assertion that the accessibility 
of information is not enough for curbing corruption if publicity and accountability remain weak. 
Transparency in this sense is a "different ‒ and, as it seems, less effective ‒ medicine against cor-
ruption compared to a free press" (Lindstedt and Naurin 2010:316). 
Evidently, most research on free media and corruption is dominated by economics with the under-
lying assumption that accessibility to information is a crucial determinant of the efficiency of eco-
nomic markets and similar assumptions are being made about political markets. All studies present-
ed above underline the importance of media freedom for controlling corruption and reach the same 
conclusion: that free media will serve to improve citizens’ accessibility to information which in turn 
will make it more difficult for politicians and those in power to cover up, or get away with, clien-
telism and a corrupt behavior. The relationship of the two variables is confirmed in different set-
tings that employed different measures and controlled for numerous political, economic and social 
variables. However, the importance of media freedom as a check on the levels of corruption is not 
the whole story.  In order to enhance our knowledge about the role free media play in society we 
need to investigate the effects of free media on both the input side (access to public authority) and 
the output side of government performance (how public authority is exercised) and start looking 
somewhere in between the concept of democracy and the concept of corruption as an indicator of 
quality of government. 
 
Quality of Government 
Even though good governance has become an often used concept and many definitions have been 
presented, there is no consensus on what good governance and quality of government comprises. 
The World Bank, claiming to be one of the early promoters of the term governance (Governance 
1994:xiv), describes good governance as being  
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"epitomized by predictable; open, and enlightened policymaking (that is, transparent 
processes); a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of gov-
ernment accountable for its actions, and a strong civil society participating in public 
affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law" (Governance 1994: vii). 
While pointing out that "the term is used with great flexibility" causing "some difficulty at the oper-
ational level", the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights ascertains 
"that good governance relates to political and institutional processes and outcomes 
that are deemed necessary to achieve the goals of development. It has been said that 
good governance is the process whereby public institutions conduct public affairs, 
manage public resources and guarantee the realization of human rights in a manner 
essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with due regard for the rule of law" (Of-
fice of the United Nations... not dated). 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) limits its definition to 
the latter aspect and relates good governance "to the management of government in a manner that 
is essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with due regard for the rule of law" (OECD 2007). 
These examples demonstrate the broad range of criteria that definitions of good governance draw 
and at the same time make it difficult to distinguish good governance from related concepts. In 
particular, the emphasis on human rights and the rule of law points to the definitional closeness of 
good governance and democracy. 
Rothstein and Teorell (2008) try to overcome the definitional confusion with their quality of gov-
ernment (QoG) concept. This is an output-related construct that stands for good governance and is 
to be distinguished from the input-related concept of democracy. They argue that democracy most-
ly concerns access to public power while quality of government refers to the exercise of public 
power. Quality of government is generally outlined as the "impartiality of institutions that exercise 
government authority" (2008:165). For their definition of impartiality, the authors refer to 
Strömberg (2000): "When implementing laws and policies, government officials shall not take into 
consideration anything about the citizen/case that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the 
law" (Rothstein and Teorell 2008:170). They concede that democracy and quality of government 
overlap to some extent but regard democracy only as "a necessary but insufficient criterion of 
QoG" because "if QoG were merely to equal democracy, the importance of how power is exercised 
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would be left out" (emphasis in the original; 2008:166). In this study I use the term “QoG” from 
Rothstein and Teorell (2008) and referring to the ability a state has to perform its activities in an 
efficient, impartial way and without corruption. 
Inspired by the earlier research, it is the aim of the study presented here to examine the influence of 
media freedom on QoG. The flow of information permits citizens to judge and response on the 
effectiveness of bureaucracies and of those in power. Accessibility to information is essential for 
citizens’ ability to hold those in power accountable for their actions. Besley and Burgess (2001:634) 
claim that, government “(i) responsiveness should be greater where information flows are more 
developed as this enables vulnerable citizens to monitor politicians and penalize them for not re-
sponding to their needs (ii) responsiveness should be greater where political participation is greater 
as this increases the likelihood that citizens will punish unresponsive incumbents.” While Lindstedt 
and Naurin (2010) suggests that, that the accessibility to information is not enough for curbing 
corruption if publicity and accountability remain weak. 
 
Data 
The data for this study come from different sources. The following part first describes the two 
criterion variables and then introduces the predictor and control variables that were used for re-
gression analyses in order to assess the influence of media freedom on the quality of government 
institutions. 
Measuring Quality of Government 
Two different indexes are used as criterion variables for QoG in the regression analyses. The rea-
son for this is the ability to study the relationship between media freedom and QoG, and to see if 
and how the focal relationship changes. The first definition is operationalized by the commonly 
used expert-based composite index the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) uses for assessing 
QoG and includes three different indicators; “corruption”, “law and order”, and “quality of bu-
reaucracy”. This index is similar to the one used by Hall and Jones (1999) as a measure of the quali-
ty of “the institutions and government policies that determine the economic environment” (Hall 
and Jones 1999: 97). The components of this index have also been used in the political economics 
literature as measures of government efficiency (Knack and Keefer 1995; La Porta et al. 1999). The 
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second definition is more related to the output of public services and is operationalized by a com-
posite index that captures “corruption”, “impartiality”, and “quality” of public education, law en-
forcement, and public health care systems.  
The ICRG index (henceforth ICRG QoG Index) ranges between 0 (low quality) and 1 (high quali-
ty), and consists of three different components: The first component is an evaluation of corruption 
within the political system and focuses on two different types of corruption: fiscal corruption in the 
form of demands for special payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses (ex-
change controls, tax assessments etc), and what ICRG calls actual or potential corruption, “in the form 
of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, ‘favor-for-favors’, secret party funding, and 
suspiciously close ties between politics and business”, which ICRG mean are of much greater risk 
to foreign business than financial corruption (Teorell et al. 2011:53). The second component, law 
and order, also consists of two different parts, which are assessed separately. “Law” is an estimation 
of the legal system with focus on strength and impartiality, while “Order” is an estimation of the 
execution of the law. This means that, a country, even if it gets a low rating because of a high crime 
rate or laws is ignored routinely without sanctions, can enjoy a high rating in terms of its judicial 
system. Finally, the third component captures the institutional quality and strength of the bureau-
cracy. This means for example that countries with the ability to govern without interruptions or 
major changes in policy or government services score high, while countries that lack of a “strong” 
bureaucracy score low (Teorell et al. 2011:54). The ICRG QoG Index is applied on all 27 EU coun-
tries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.  
The second index, taken from Charron et al. (2011) (henceforth EU QoG Index) ranges between -
2.10 (lowest quality) and 1.88 (highest quality), and consists of aggregated (and weighted) citizen-
based survey data that combines 12 questions about citizens experiences of three general public 
services (public education, public health care, and law enforcement) and centred around three dif-
ferent QoG concepts. “Quality” is captured by three survey questions where the respondents can 
rate the quality of the police force, the quality of public education, and the quality of the public 
health care system and ranges between -2.14 (lowest quality) and 1.71 (highest quality). “Impartiali-
ty” is captured by three questions where the respondents can rate how much they agree with the 
statement that all citizens are treated equally by the police force, in the public education system, and 
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in the public health care system and ranges between -1.70 (lowest impartiality) and 1.26 (highest 
impartiality). “Corruption” is captured by three questions about the prevalence of corruption in the 
police force, the public education system, and the public health care system and ranges between -
2.25 (high corruption) and 1.88 (low corruption). The EU QoG Index is, due to the original sam-
ple, applicable on 18 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Swe-
den and United Kingdom. A more detailed description of the EU QoG Index can be found in 
Charron et al. (2010).  
 
The Predictor 
For measuring media freedom I use the composite Freedom of the Press Index compiled by Free-
dom House and the most widely used indicator to evaluate media freedom (see e.g., Ahrend 2002; 
Brunetti and Weder 2003; Choudhury 2004; Norris 2006; Charron 2009; Lindstedt and Naurin 
2010).  
The Freedom of the Press Index ranges from 0 (least free) and 50 (most free) and consists of three 
component ratings of economic factors that affect the access to information, political pressures that 
influence reporting, and legal environment for the media (Freedom House 2010). 
The first component, economic factors that affect the access to information, examines the econom-
ic environment for the media. This includes structure, transparency, and concentration of media 
ownership; the impact of bribery and corruption on media content; the selective maintenance of 
advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors; and the extent to which the economic situation 
in a country impacts the development of the media. The second component, political pressures that 
influence reporting, examines the political control over media content and include the editorial 
independence (i.e. official censorship and self-censorship) of both state-owned and privately owned 
media; the ability of both foreign and local journalists to cover the news freely and without harass-
ment; as well as intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary detention 
and imprisonment, violent assaults, and other threats. Finally, the third component, legal environ-
ment for the media, encompasses laws and regulations that could influence media content and the 
government’s propensity to limit media’s ability to operate freely. Freedom House also assesses the 
impact of both constitutional and legal guarantees for freedom of expression as well as the penal 
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code and potentially negative aspects of security legislation (i.e. penalties for libel and defamation) 
and independence of the judiciary and of official media regulatory bodies. A more detailed descrip-
tion of the Freedom of the Press Index can be found in Freedom House (2010).  
Control variables 
To obtain independent effects of media freedom, following control variables has been considered 
of most interest for the focal relationship in previous research and included in the regression mod-
els; regime type (i.e. Markowski 2006; Lederman et al. 2005), electoral system (i.e. Persson et al. 
2003; Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Charron 2011), centralization (i.e. Gerring and Thacker 
2004; Treisman 2000), and political empowerment (i.e. Dollar et al. 2001; Swamy et al. 2001; Sung 
2003; Goetz 2007).  
Political accountability is regarded a key attribute and essential for democratization. However, vot-
er’s ability to hold governments accountable is determined by the flow of information provided 
from media (see e.g., Stapenhurst 2000; Besley and Burgess 2001; Chowdhury 2004). Thus, free 
media provide flows of information compensating voters’ incapability to monitor those in power 
directly. Previous research suggests that the mechanisms of accountability are stronger in parlia-
mentary systems (Markowski 2006; Lederman et al. 2005; Bailey and Valenzuela 1997). Lederman et 
al. (2005) shows empirically that corruption decrease systematically in countries with parliamentary 
systems and with free media in that “parliamentary systems allow for stronger and more immediate 
monitoring of the executive by the legislature because in this case parliaments have the power to 
remove politicians from executive office” (Lederman et al. 2005: 5). The regime type measure is 
acquired from the Database of Political Institutions (Keefer 2010), and after modified and made 
dichotomous it distinguishes presidential (equal to 0) or parliamentary systems (equal to 1). 
That a country’s electoral rules and party system have significant impact on levels of corruption has 
been established empirically by a number of recent studies (Persson et al. 2003; Kunicová and 
Rose-Ackerman 2005; Birch 2007; Charron 2011). Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005:579) argue 
that, “electoral rules affect the probability of detection by shaping the incentives and ability of polit-
ical actors to monitor corrupt political rent-seeking”. However, there is no overall consensus on 
which electoral rules that best offset corruption. Myerson (1993) mean that proportional represen-
tation (PR) systems, on average, should produce less corruption than first past the post (FPTP) or 
majoritarian systems because it is more likely to produce a multi-party system. While other scholars 
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have maintained that PR systems produce more incentives for corruption than single-member dis-
trict (SMD) systems (Persson et al. 2003; Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005). Charron (2011) 
shows that in FPTP systems, incentives are higher for the opposition to engage in monitoring of 
incumbent behavior and more prone to produce two-party systems, and therefore FPTP have low-
er perceived corruption and higher QoG than their majoritarian counterparts. Thus it can be con-
cluded that PR systems are more likely to be short of unambiguous accountability and transparency 
in decision-making (because of indecisive outcomes, unstable regimes etc.) and therefore also a 
more difficult position in terms of generating QoG. The electoral system type measure is an ad-
justment of Golder’s (2005) variable indicating the type of electoral formula used. The original 
measure was categorized into four electoral system types. After modified and made dichotomous it 
distinguishes majoritarian (equal to 0) from PR systems (equal to 1). 
In the discussion on decentralization and federalism, the focus is on checks and balances, how to 
restrain the central power, and to make governments and the bureaucracy more responsive and 
efficient (see e.g. Bardhan 2002; de Mello and Barenstein 2001; Manor 1999). However, the empiri-
cal results on the relationship between decentralization and QoG do not prove conclusive. On the 
one hand, there are scholars that argue in favour of decentralization, claiming that it improves gov-
ernment efficiency (Fisman and Gatti 2002; Hunther and Shaw 1998). On the other hand, there are 
scholars arguing that decentralization reduces the opportunities for accountability and instead mean 
that it is likely to lead to more corruption (Treisman 2000; Gerring and Thacker 2004). However, in 
order to better understand the effects of decentralization, recent studies has started to look at the 
settings in which decentralization takes place and distinguished between developing countries and 
developed countries (see e.g., Bardhan 2002). In developed countries decentralization has been 
linked with a reduction of regional inequality and in less developed countries with substantial rise in 
regional disparities (Rodriguez-Pose and Ezscurra 2010). The decentralization measure is retrieved 
from the Institutions and Elections Project (IAEP) and describes “the relationship between the 
central and those regional governments that are immediately below the central government” (Regan 
and Clark 2010:8). The variable has been dichotomized and distinguishes federal systems (equal to 
0) from unitary systems (equal to 1). 
Finally, several findings point out that there is a negative relationship between the number of wom-
en in the national parliament and the level of corruption, the higher the number of women, the 
lower the level of corruption (Dollar et al. 2001; Swamy et al. 2001). The findings also pinpoint that 
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the casual mechanism seems to be that corruption causes particular harm to poor sections of the 
population and that women, who make up the majority of the poor, are thus generally more affect-
ed by dysfunctional governments. However, the causal direction of the relationship has been ques-
tioned where some scholars suggest that it is rather the strength of liberal democracy that should be 
highlighted instead of the number of women in influential positions (Sung 2003; Bjarnegård 2006; 
Goetz 2007). Wängnerud (2010:19) instead come to the conclusion that “hypotheses brought for-
ward in previous research on gender and corruption not should be rejected”, that the number of 
women in parliament and the level of equality, both seem to have a positive effect on QoG, and 
“what everyone seems to agree upon is that the number of women in leading positions (political as 
well as bureaucratic) within a society is a useful “proxy” for good governance” (Wängnerud 
2008:1ff). The political empowerment measure is one of the sub indexes used to construct the 
World Economic Forum's Gender Gap Index. Political empowerment “combines the ratio of fe-
male to male members of parliament, the ratio of women to men in ministerial level positions and 
the ratio of women to men in head of state or head of government positions in the last 50 years” 
(Hausmann et al. 2010:4). Please see the Appendix for a more detailed description of the control 
variables. 
Table 1 presents the correlations between the variables in this study. It is clear that three of the 
variables in the study stand out. First there are strong positive correlations between the two varia-
bles that measure QoG. There is also a positive correlation between the variables in the focal rela-
tionship where the correlation between ICRG QoG Index and media freedom are the strongest. 
Which gives a strong indication of a robust linear relationship between countries free media and 
their QoG: the freer media, the higher QoG – or put another way, the higher QoG, the freer me-
dia. Similarly, there is a positive correlation between political empowerment and QoG. Which in 
this case means that the ratio of female to male members of parliament, the ratio of women to men 
in ministerial level positions and the ratio of women to men in head of state or head of government 
positions is important for the variation in QoG across countries and vice versa. The positive corre-
lation between free media and political empowerment also indicates that media freedom and wom-
en’s political empowerment are linearly related. 
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TABLE 1 CORRELATIONS OF VARIABLES (PEARSON'S R) 
 
Quality of Gov-
ernment 
(ICRG_QoG_Ind
ex) 
Quality of Gov-
ernment    (EU 
QoG Index) 
Media 
Freedom Regime Type 
Electoral 
System Type 
Government 
Centralization 
Quality of Government  
(EU QoG Index) .851**           
Media Freedom .808** .625**     
Regime Type .227 .136 .006    
Electoral System Type .170 -.011 .181 .070   
Government Centralization -.140 -.010 .013 .047 .149  
Political Empowerment .689** .766** .603** .323 .257 -.139 
Notes: ** Correlation is significant at the .05 level. 
 
Findings 
While the function of the media in and for democracy is non-contentious, even democratic states 
differ in their arrangements to secure press freedom and particularly in their informal relations be-
tween the state, its representatives and the media. The sample used here are the 27 member states 
of the European Union (EU). Even though democracies and at the same time members of the 
Council of Europe and therefore signatories of the European Convention of Human Rights, the 
EU member states are currently spread from rank 1 (Finland, Sweden) to 88 (Romania) on the 
Freedom House Scale (Freedom of the Press, 2010) and from 1 to 70 on the Press Freedom Index 
drawn up by Reporters without Borders (2010). Since the rankings of one year are only snapshots 
and may be influenced by singular events, the use of press freedom score and comparison over 
time gives a better impression of the stability or instability of a country's media freedom.  
 
Using the Freedom House scale, there is considerable variation among the individual country 
scores for the International Country Risk Guide’s QoG indicator. The 27 countries reach scores 
between 0.42 and 1.00, the latter standing for the highest QoG. Finland enjoys the highest ranking 
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closely followed, by Denmark (0.97) while Bulgaria (0.42) and Romania (0.44) are the two countries 
with the lowest QoG scores. Table 2 gives an overview of the Press Freedom Index scores for the 
27 EU Member states in 2006 and 2010, displays the ICRG QoG scores for all countries of the 
sample in 2010, and the EU QoG scores for 18 of the countries of the sample in 2009. 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 FREEDOM OF THE PRESS INDEX, ICRG’S QOG INDEX AND EU 
QOG INDEX 
Country 
Freedom of the 
Press 2006
a
 
Freedom of the 
Press 2010
a
 
Quality of Gov-
ernment (ICRG 
QoG Index)
b
 
Quality of Gov-
ernment (EU 
QoG Index)
c
 
Austria 32 32 0.94 0.74 
Belgium 42 41 0.81 0.71 
Bulgaria 20 19 0.42 -2.10 
Cyprus 31 31 0.83 - 
Czech Rep. 35 35 0.67 -0.52 
Denmark 43 42 0.97 1.88 
Estonia 37 36 0.60 - 
Finland 44 43 1.00 - 
France 31 30 0.81 -0.06 
Germany 37 36 0.89 0.55 
Greece 26 24 0.61 -1.74 
Hungary 32 30 0.64 -1.11 
Ireland 38 38 0.86 - 
Italy 24 20 0.57 -0.20 
Latvia 31 27 0.60 - 
Lithuania 35 32 0.54 - 
Luxembourg 41 41 0.94 - 
Malta 33 31 0.72 - 
Netherlands 40 39 0.94 1.37 
Poland 29 29 0.64 -0.75 
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Portugal 37 37 0.75 -0.82 
Romania 9 10 0.44 -0.55 
Slovakia 31 30 0.61 -2.00 
Slovenia 30 28 0.67 - 
Spain 30 29 0.75 0.34 
Sweden 42 43 0.94 1.36 
United King-
dom 35 34 0.86 1.05 
Notes: aPress Freedom Index scores ranging from 0 (not free) to 50 (free). Source: Freedom 
House 2006 and 2010. bQuality of Government Index scores ranging from 0 (low quality) to 
1 (high quality). Source: the International Country Risk Guide 2010. cQuality of Govern-
ment Index scores ranging from -2.10 (low quality) to 1.88 (high quality).  
Source: Charron, Lapuente and Dykstra 2011. 
 
The EU member states that comprised the sample of this study pertain to different models of me-
dia systems. According to the Hallin and Mancini (2004) typology, the North European countries 
mostly feature a democratic-corporatist model which is ‒ in addition to political parallelism and 
journalistic professionalism ‒ characterized by the state taking on an active role in media policy 
guided by social responsibility (2004:144-5). Nevertheless, these countries regularly appear at the 
top of the freedom of the media rankings, their state intervention in the media field obviously not 
being detrimental to media freedom.  They also score high on different QoG indexes. 
Figure 1 displays the focal relationship between media freedom and QoG graphically using the 
average Freedom of the Press Index score for the period 1993 to 2010 and the average ICRG QoG 
Index score for the period 1984 to 2010. The scatter plot reveals the variation structure of the focal 
relationship among the 27 European countries and confirms the variation among the individual 
country in Table 1. Eastern European countries are clustered to the left, reflecting their lower levels 
of QoG. Western and Northern European countries are clustered in the upper right corner, reflect-
ing both higher levels of QoG and higher levels of media freedom. 
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FIGURE 1 MEDIA FREEDOM / QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE 
 
Notes: Media Freedom is the Freedom of the Press Index average score for the period 1993 to 2010 and ranging from 0 (not 
free) to 50 (free). Source: Freedom House, 1993-2010. The indicator of Quality of Government is the average score for the 
period 1984 to 2010 and ranging from 0 (low quality) to 1 (high quality). Source: The International Country Risk Guide, 
1984-2010.  
 
 
To put it differently, there is a clear difference in high or low QoG between countries in the former 
Eastern bloc and Western European democracies, but less difference in terms of media freedom. 
This pattern is most evident for the variation in media freedom across the European countries with 
an average score between 30-40. Within this limited range of average media freedom score there are 
countries from all regions of Europe represented, with a considerable variation in QoG (from Lith-
uania with an average score of 0.56 to Austria with an average score of 0.93). 
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Figure 1 indicates a positive relationship between media freedom and QoG. However, there is a 
need for further specifications of the focal relationship. In the first set of specifications I use OLS 
regression models to observe the bivariate relationship between media freedom and QoG and in-
vestigate how the focal relationship changes after controlling for other variables. In the second 
specification, the interaction effects between media freedom and regime type, electoral system type, 
government centralization, and political empowerment are included in the regression model indi-
vidually.  
Table 3 reports the results from the regression analysis. The main variable of interest, media free-
dom, has a strong significant positive effect on QoG in the bivariate relationship. The results sug-
gest that if media freedom is increased one step (on a fifty pointed scale), QoG increases by 0.17 
units and explains more than 60 percent of the variations in QoG (R2=.64). The highly significant 
effect in the bivariate relationship also holds in a regression analysis even after the control variables 
are included in the model.  
In the multivariate regression model, the effect of media freedom has decreased but still maintains 
highly significant and positive effects on QoG and explains almost 70 percent of the variations in 
the dependent variable (R2=.69). When looking at the control variables, all coefficients are insignifi-
cant. The data suggest that none of the added control variables are significantly associated with 
QoG. 
 
TABLE 3 THE EFFECT OF MEDIA FREEDOM ON QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT (ICRG QOG INDEX) 
  Bivariate   Multivariate     Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4 
Media Freedom .017***   .015*** (1) -.008   .015***  .012*  .014** 
(0=not free, 50=free) (.003)  (.003)   (.019)  (.003)  (.005)  (.004) 
Regime Type (RT)   .075 (2) -.665  .075  .077  .074 
(0=presidential, 1=parliamentary)   (.055)   (.616)  (.057)  (.056)  (.057) 
Electoral System Type (EST)   -.001 (3) .002  -.026  -.007  .000 
(0=proportional, 1=majoritarian)   (.049)   (.048)  (.281)  (.050)  (.050) 
Government Centralization (GC)   -.042 (4) -.029  -.043  -.158  -.044 
(0=federal, 1=unitary)   (.038)   (.039)  (.039)  (.177)  (.039) 
Political Empowerment (PE)   .254 (5) .231  .254  .262  .064 
(mean ratio)   (.194)   (.193)  (.198)  (.197)  (.770) 
             
Interaction:             
Media Freedom x RT      .023       
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      (.019)       
Media Freedom x EST        .001     
        (.009)     
Media Freedom x GC          .004   
          (.005)   
Media Freedom x PE            .005 
            (.020) 
                          
Constant .189*  .176   .893  .178  .260  .206 
 (.083)  (.099)   (.603)  (.103)  (.160)  (.154) 
Adjusted R
2
 .64  .69   .70  .67  .68  .68 
N= 27             
Notes: *p < .01, **p < .05, ***p < .001. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, with OLS standard errors within 
paretheses. Collinearity VIF: (1) 1.72, (2) 1.21, (3) 1.11, (4) 1.10, (5) 2.07.  
 
When it comes to the interaction effects between media freedom and the control variables, firstly, 
the results suggests that there are no significant interaction effects. This means that there is no sig-
nificant difference in the focal relationship between countries political context captured by the in-
teraction variables. In model 1 the media freedom coefficient has a negative sign and has become 
insignificant but the main effect of media freedom continues to be significant and positive 
throughout the rest of the specifications of the interaction terms in the three remaining models. In 
model 2 the results imply that there is a strong independent positive effect of media freedom on 
QoG regardless of countries electoral rules and party system. This also applies to the results from 
model 3 and model 4 where the significant media freedom coefficients suggests that media freedom 
has an independent effect on QoG regardless of government centralization and political empow-
erment. 
 
On the basis of significant coefficients and specifications of different interaction terms, the results 
from table 3 imply that the answer to the question if media freedom contributes to high levels of 
quality of government, is yes – the focal relationship remains robust and significant. 
The results from table 4 is based on the same specifications of the focal relationship as in table 3 
but on the more public service related definition of QoG operationalized by the EU QoG Index. 
The significant coefficient implies a positive bivariate relationship between media freedom and 
QoG and which in this case means that media freedom explains approximately 35 percent of the 
variations in QoG (R2=.35). 
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TABLE 4 THE EFFECT OF MEDIA FREEDOM ON QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT (EU QOG INDEX) 
  Bivariate   Multivariate     Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4 
Media Freedom .086**   .025 (1) .023   .027  .056  -.038 
(0=not free, 50=free) (.027)  (.031)   (.043)  (.033)  (.049)  (.046) 
Regime Type (RT)   .047 (2) .002  .042  -.092  -.015 
(0=presidential, 1=parliamentary)   (.881)   (.030)  (.919)  (.911)  (.814) 
Electoral System Type (EST)   .764 (3) .764  1.21  .907  .814 
(0=proportional, 1=majoritarian)   (.509)   (.509)  (2.53)  .547  (.471) 
Government Centralization (GC)   .139 (4) .139  .144  1.59  -.237 
(0=federal, 1=unitary)   (.410)   (.410)  (.429)  (1.85)  (.435) 
Political Empowerment (PE)   6.99** (5) 6.99**  6.95*  7.43**  -6.12 
(mean ratio)   (2.24)   (2.24)  (2.35)  (2.34)  (7.74) 
             
Interaction:             
Media Freedom x RT      .002       
      (.030)       
Media Freedom x EST        -.015     
        (.086)     
Media Freedom x GC          -.045   
          (.056)   
Media Freedom x PE            .380 
                        (.216) 
Constant -2.78**  -2.77*   -1.95  -2.81*  -3.74*  -.556 
 (.864)  (1.06)   (.806)  (1.13)  (1.62)  (1.59) 
Adjusted R
2
 .35  .54   .54  .50  .53  .61 
N= 18             
Notes: *p < .01, **p < .05, ***p < .001. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, with OLS standard errors within 
paretheses. Collinearity VIF: (1) 1.82, (2) 1.12, (3) 1.23, (4) 1.14, (5) 2.01. 
 
In the multivariate regression model, the significant effect of media freedom weakens and disap-
pears. Instead, there is a positive significant effect from women’s opportunities for political em-
powerment on QoG. What is even more interesting is that the significant effect of political em-
powerment remains unchanged and positively and significantly associated with QoG in three of the 
four regression models. Model 1 to 4 reflects the results for these interactions suggesting no signifi-
cant interaction effects between media freedom and any of the interaction variables controlled for 
in the models. In model 4 the political empowerment coefficient changes sign and becomes insig-
nificant with large standard errors indicating problem of multicollinearity. It is however important 
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to note the difference between coefficients in interaction models and variables in an additive model 
in that coefficients in an interaction model not indicate the average effect of a certain variable. 
Nevertheless, the results from table 4 implies that the answer to the question if media freedom 
contributes to high levels of quality of government, is no – the focal relationship between media 
freedom and the more public service related concept of QoG disappears once the control variables 
are included in the model. 
One way to overcome the problem of large standard errors and multicollinearity and not least to 
sort out if and if so, in what ways political empowerment affects the focal relationship is to examine 
the EU QoG Index subcomponents 
 
TABLE 5 THE EFFECT OF MEDIA FREEDOM ON QUALITY, IMPARTIALITY, AND CORRUPTION 
  Quality   Impartiality Corruption 
  
  Quality   Impartiality   Corruption 
Media Freedom .056   .058* .105**  -.091   -.033  .027 
(0=not free, 50=free) (.028)  (.024) (.025)  (.047)  (.041)  (.044) 
Regime Type      -.105  .589  -.516 
(0=presidential, 1=parliamentary)      (.838)  (.730)  (.779) 
Electoral System Type      1.07  .071  .931 
(0=proportional, 1=majoritarian)      (.485)  (.422)  (.450) 
Government Centralization      -.173  -.550  .120 
(0=federal, 1=unitary)      (.447)  (.390)  (.416) 
Political Empowerment (PE)      -17.8*  -1.12  3.63 
(mean ratio)      (7.96)  (6.94)  (7.40) 
           
Interaction:           
Media Freedom x PE      .654**  .205  .103 
          
  
  (.222)   (.194)   (.207) 
Constant -1.78  -1.88* -3.42**  1.68  -.719  -2.42 
 (.911)  (.766) (.811)  (1.64)  (1.43)  (1.53) 
Adjusted R
2
 .15  .23 .49  .51  .52  .68 
N= 18           
Notes: *p < .01, **p < .05, ***p < .001. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, with OLS standard errors within paretheses. 
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In table 5, the bivariate relationship and interaction effects of political empowerment on the rela-
tionship between media freedom and the three subcomponents of the EU QoG Index are exam-
ined separately. The data suggests that the focal relationship is mainly driven by media freedom on 
the subcomponents that capture impartiality and corruption. When it comes to the interaction ef-
fects of political empowerment on the relationship between media freedom and the subcategories 
there are some interesting results. The significant and positive effect of media freedom on impar-
tiality and corruption disappear. Instead there is a significant and positive interaction effect of polit-
ical empowerment on the relationship between media freedom and quality. One reasonable expla-
nation is due to differences in how the two QoG measures are constructed.  The ICRG QoG Index 
is aimed at mainly international investors, which could imply that QoG is more geared toward less 
red tape and business friendly environments. The EU QoG Index, on the other hand, focuses pri-
marily on quality, impartiality, and corruption within public services and welfare systems, and QoG 
provided to its citizens. Table 5 reveals the result from the interaction suggesting that the ability to 
explain and increase QoG is best done if media freedom and political empowerment are increased 
simultaneously and with significant positive effect on the quality “pillar” of the public service relat-
ed QoG concept. 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
In this study, quality of government was used as the dependent variable and media freedom was 
assumed to be a predictor. This design was inspired by earlier research but can also claim theoreti-
cal logic. Free media, independent of the state, is in the position to go beyond its information func-
tion and fulfill a role as a watchdog vis-à-vis those in power. The possibility of the media engaging 
in investigative journalism combined with the prospect of irregularities being publicly revealed and 
scandalized operates as an antidote to crooked dealings in the political and the administrative sys-
tem and thus supports QoG.  
Earlier studies have examined the relationship between media freedom and the level of corruption. 
In this study I treated corruption as one among other indicators of the exercise of public authority 
and used two different definitions of the broader concept of QoG. As a consequence, this lead to 
totally different results depending on which definition of QoG I used in the analyses. The com-
monly used ICRG QoG Index includes a subcomponent of QoG that refers to corruption, the 
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other two stand for "law and order", which represents the impartiality of a country's legal system, 
and "bureaucracy quality" indicating the quality of government services. When this index is used for 
examine the focal relationship the results show a significant positive relationship between media 
freedom and QoG. This result not only corroborates earlier findings but demonstrates also the 
effectiveness of a free media as a critic of the power system and confirms Baker's assessment con-
tending: "Exposure of government corruption or incompetence ‒ [...] ‒ is probably the most im-
portant contribution the press can make to democracy." (2002:133) However, when the focal rela-
tionship is examined with the EU QoG Index, which is more specifically related to the output of 
public services and welfare systems, the significant positive relationship between media freedom 
and QoG turns insignificant and disappear. Instead, there is an interaction effect suggesting that the 
ability to explain and improve QoG is best done if media freedom and political empowerment are 
increased simultaneously and with significant positive effect on the quality of public services as a 
result. Hence the findings are dissimilar to previous research, not impartiality nor in the fight 
against corruption. As already mentioned, one reasonable explanation could be found in the differ-
ences in how the two QoG indexes are constructed. The ICRG QoG Index is aimed at mainly 
international investors, which could imply that QoG is more geared toward less red tape and busi-
ness friendly environments. The EU QoG Index, on the other hand, focuses primarily on quality, 
impartiality, and corruption within public services and welfare systems, and QoG provided to its 
citizens. 
In addition to Lindstedt and Naurin (2010), which found interaction effect of media freedom and 
electoral accountability and emphasize that the "publicity condition" must be accompanied by an 
"accountability condition" in order to fight corruption. The results of this study suggest the need of 
an “empowerment condition” or a “big bang condition” – everything must be in place for the free 
media to have an impact (see e.g., Rothstein 2011). Freedom of the media plays an important role 
in the fight against corruption when it is accompanied by a modernization mechanism such as 
women’s abilities for political empowerment. Although, the results of this study implies interaction 
effect of political empowerment and media freedom: free media requires a reduction of the gap 
between those with and those without political empowerment in order to create and increase QoG 
provided to citizens through public services and welfare systems. To reach two such completely 
different results depending on which definition of QoG utilized is remarkable. Numerous policy 
proposals and general recommendations from international actors (i.e. the World Bank, UN, 
OECD, EU) profoundly emphasize the importance of free media in controlling corruption and 
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promoting well functioning government institutions. Yet, this study emphasizes that the im-
portance of media freedom in processes of establishing, improving and maintaining QoG needs to 
be more nuanced. 
Nevertheless, it must be recognized that this is a first attempt to examine the role of free media in 
creating and increasing countries QoG. Therefore, one should be cautious about drawing too 
strong conclusions from this study as it has its limitations. On the one hand, the empirical evidence 
from this study suggests a strong association between media freedom and QoG. On the other 
hand, the result from this study suggests interaction effect of political empowerment and free me-
dia. 
Overall, the results of this study imply that there is still need for more research to carry out on the 
role and consequences of free media. Freedom of the media is under constant threat and cannot be 
regarded as being stable over time even in countries with high QoG. It has to be left for future 
research to examine whether different models of media systems that are defined by different rela-
tionships between politicians and the media, and how countries’ historical contexts and alternative 
indicators of media freedom, other than just the conditions for media to operate freely (i.e. expo-
sure and accessibility), may contribute to high QoG. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 1 DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES 
Variables Description Sources 
 Dependent variables   
QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT  
(ICRG QoG Index) 
Corruption, law and order, bureaucracy quality (scaled 
from 0=low quality, to 1=high quality). 
 
The PRS Group "The International 
Country Risk 
  
Guide (ICRG)" (Data from 2010).   
    
QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT (EU QoG 
Index) 
Mean score on quality, impartiality, and corruption within 
public education, public health care and law enforcement 
(range between -2.10 ~ 1.88). 
Charron, Lapuente and Dykstra (2011) 
(Data from 2009). 
EU QoG Index subcategories: 
  
QUALITY 
Mean score on quality of public education, public health 
care and law enforcement (range between -2.14 ~1.71). 
Charron, Lapuente and Dykstra (2011) 
(Data from 2009). 
IMPARTIALITY 
Mean score on impartiality of public education, public 
health care and law enforcement (range between -1.7 ~ 
1.26). 
Charron, Lapuente and Dykstra (2011) 
(Data from 2009). 
CORRUPTION 
Mean score on corruption in public education, public 
health care and law enforcement (range between -2.25 
~2.02). 
Charron, Lapuente and Dykstra (2011) 
(Data from 2009). 
    
 Independent variable   
MEDIA FREEDOM Measures economic influences, political pressures and 
controls, and laws and regulations influence over media 
content. 
Freedom House (Data from 2010). 
 (0=not free, 50=free).  
    
 Control variables   
REGIME TYPE 
Parliamentary vs. Presidential political system 
(0=presidential, 1=parliamentary). 
Keefer "Database of Political Institutions" 
(Data from 2010). 
   
ELECTORAL SYSTEM 
Majoritarian vs. proportional electoral system 
(0=majoritarian, 1=proportional). 
Golder (2005) and The Quality of Gov-
ernment Institute 
  (Data from 2005). 
   
GOVERNMENT CENTRALIZATION Federal vs. unitary system (0=federal, 1=unitary). Regan and Clark "the Institutions and 
Elections Project (IAEP)" (Data from 
2010). 
   
POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT The mean ratio of female to male members World Economic Forum 
 of parliament, minesterial level, and "Gender Gap Index" 
 head of state or government in the  (Data from 2010). 
 last 50 years (range between .03 ~ .57).  
        
 
